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WELFARE STATES AND DIMENSIONS OF
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Cross-national comparisons of social contacts
in European countries
Peer Scheepers, Manfred Te Grotenhuis and John
Gelissen
University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT: We set out to describe and explain differences in the amount of
some dimensions of social capital within and between European societies.
Social capital refers to a wide range of social phenomena; however, we
focus on social contacts with family and friends. We derive hypotheses
about cross-national differences in social capital from theories on the
nature of welfare state regimes. We test these hypotheses with multi-level
analyses on Eurobarometer data, collected in thirteen countries. We nd
signicant variance across different countries. This variance is partly
explained by individual characteristics: religious people and people living in
medium-sized or rural towns have more social contacts. Moreover, we nd
quite differential effects of other individual characteristics on social
contacts and no effects of political stances. Differences in the cross-
national compositions in educational attainment and household size also
account for the variance in social contacts. Finally, people living in social-
democratic regimes turn out to have the smallest amount of social contacts,
whereas people living in the Latin Rim have the largest amount. In between,
we nd people living in liberal, respectively, conservative-corporatist
regimes. This explanation is opposed to the hypothesis that it is the
difference in social security rates that causes differences in social capital.
Key words: social contacts; individual determinants; welfare states; multi-
level analyses
Impacts of welfare state regimes on dimensions of social capital?
Since the monumental study by Esping-Andersen (1990), there has been









overview, Abrahamson 1999). Although many authors have suggested that
living in different welfare regimes may have quite different consequences
for an individual, Svallfors (1997: 283) emphasizes that none of the sub-
sequent studies has made attempts to study the potential effects of the
various policy regimes. As yet, there have been some studies considering
the impacts of welfare state regimes on values (Gundelach 1994), attitudes
on welfare arrangements (Bonoli 2000; Gelissen 2000; Gevers et al. 2000;
Svallfors 1997), and attitudes to unemployment and the unemployed
(Fridberg and Ploug 2000). However, no studies as yet have been devoted
to consider the consequences of living in particular welfare state regimes
for ordinary daily routines of people. We consider this to be a lacuna, as
Esping-Andersen actually stated that regimes may have such far-reaching
impacts (1990: 55), i.e. in structuring the social order by policies of
decommodication, setting individuals free to uphold a reasonable
standard of living independently of work in the labour market (1990: 37).
In this contribution, we set out to ascertain whether welfare state regimes
have an impact on a specic aspect of the social order; that is, the amount
of particular dimensions of social capital, of their population.
Social capital refers to quite a wide range of social phenomena (Putnam
2001), ranging from (formal) political, civic and religious participation to
(informal) social connections. We propose to focus on these informal
social contacts: the extent to which people have contacts with and/or
access to social networks of family and friends (cf. Bourdieu 1985;
Coleman 1988) that may provide them with extra resources for mutual
cooperation (Fukuyama 1995) or to produce other commodities (Paxton
1999). This life course outcome may be of practical importance in the
daily lives of many people because these dimensions of social capital are
widely considered to be highly important for one’s mental health (cf. for
an overview Lin and Peek 1999): social capital offers opportunities
through which social support is made available and utilized. Sandefur and
Laumann (1998) propose that social capital may also contribute to infor-
mation, control and, moreover, to social solidarity: individuals rely on the
care for one another. These dimensions of social capital may also be of
theoretical importance because there is a bundle of theoretical proposi-
tions building on Durkheim (1897/1966) and, implicitly, on Tonniës
(1887/1979), suggesting that modern societies – through an ever pro-
gressing mode of functional differentiation – have evolved up to a
point where we have reached ‘Kohäsionskrisen: . . . das Schwinden von
Solidarität, . . . die Erosion sozialer Beziehungen’ [crises of cohesion: . . .
the disappearance of solidarity, . . . the erosion of social relationships]
(Heitmeyer 1997). Gundelach (1994) shows that such theses have been
theoretically inspired by structural functionalistic modernization theory
which claims that the modern individual values self-realization rather than
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social integration. Hence its general proposition is that modernization
threatens social integration. This general proposition may be rened,
moreover, when we consider potential cross-national differences related
to the different natures of welfare state regimes: the crucial difference
between welfare state regimes, according to Esping-Andersen, is the
differential extent of individual freedom provided by the extent of
decommodication. Thus the questions we set out to answer are: (1) To
what extent do countries differ with regard to the availability of particu-
lar dimensions of social capital, i.e. informal social contacts with family
and friends, of their population? (2) To what extent can we explain indi-
vidual differences by (a) national characteristics related to the type of
welfare state regime and/or (b) by individual characteristics?
Theory and hypotheses on dimensions of social capital
Cross-national differences: welfare state regimes and dimensions
of social capital
Starting from the general propositions derived from modernization or
individualization theory, one is led to believe that most people living in
modern and advanced societies suffer from individualization and hence
are faced with the breakdown of social networks of family and friends
(Beck 1986/1992; Beck-Gernsheim 1997; Heitmeyer 1997). Individual-
ization has been considered to be the outcome of two revolutionary
historical developments – the French Revolution and the Industrial
Revolution – through which people have been liberated from the once so
restrictive structures of social life (Nisbet 1976). Esping-Andersen states
that ‘in the Middle Ages, it was . . . the family, the church, or the lord that
decided a person’s capacity for survival’ (1990: 35). However, these insti-
tutions provided individuals with ‘pre-commodied’ social protection that
withered away with the blossoming of capitalism when labour power
became a commodity. As such, individual workers were given the freedom
to choose between alternative utilities, jobs, employers and leisure trade-
offs. However, this turned out to be freedom behind prison walls (1990:
37). But then, the politics of commodifying workers bred its opposite
through a historical process of decommodication, necessary for system
survival, which provided individuals with increasing possibilities to opt out
of work and to still uphold acceptable standards of living. This implies
that, over time, people gained some freedom to choose their own views,
attitudes, social surroundings and life course outcomes independently of
market participation. Since Esping-Andersen proposed that the extent to
which individuals have been decommodied differs strongly between
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welfare state regimes, we try to derive a more differential view on (the
breakdown of ) social networks, i.e. on (the loss of particular dimensions
of) social capital in different societies.
The social-democratic regime (ideal: the Nordic countries) is characterized
by the highest level of decommodication, with social security benets for
every citizen at a rather high level as compared to other regimes. Here,
social policy strives for a weakening of the inuence of the market on
distribution, and its ideal is to maximize capacities for individual
independence by granting transfers directly to children and taking
responsibility for the caring of children, the aged and the helpless (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 28) and to minimize or abolish market dependency
(Esping-Andersen 1999: 78–9). Recently, Esping-Andersen (1999: 61–3)
has empirically substantiated this proposition by showing that the
percentage of old people receiving home-help services is rather high in
these countries (amounting to some 20 per cent) whereas the percentage
of old people living with their children is extremely low (4 to 5 per cent).
Moreover, Daly and Lewis (2000) state that the Scandinavian countries
tend to collectivize caring. From these characteristics we infer that this
type of regime produces a strong individualistic independence from social
networks of family and friends because the state provides (more than) the
necessary means to participate in society. Consequentially, we expect that
living in this regime may affect society’s social capital negatively, i.e.
people in this regime are by no means forced to rely on family and friends,
and hence they may not be very eager to keep up social networks of family
and friends.
The liberal regime (ideal: the Anglo-Saxon countries) is characterized by
the lowest level of decommodication. Here, the market is considered to
be the arena for distribution of resources, and social security benets are
rather modest and social rights rather poor. This type of regime produces
a high degree of independence from the state and essentially forces people
to rely on family and friends in cases of incapacity to solve social cata-
strophies. Esping-Andersen (1999: 61–3) has recently shown that the per-
centage of old people receiving home-help services is much lower than in
social-democratic regimes, whereas the percentage of old people living
with their children is much higher. From these characteristics, we infer
that this type of regime produces strong social networks of family and
friends, possibly necessary to provide the means to participate in society.
Therefore, we expect that living in this regime will affect an individual’s
social capital positively.
The conservative-corporatist regime (ideal: France and West Germany) is
shaped by the Church with a strong emphasis on traditions – such as the
family and the pre-existing class and status structure – that embraced the
principle of subsidiarity. This type of regime is likely to interfere in
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individuals’ life course outcomes only in cases where the family’s resources
to provide help have been exhausted: it then provides social security
benets related to previous earnings and status. This eventually implies
that the family is the dominant locus of solidarity (Esping-Andersen 1999:
85). From this characterization, we infer that the level of social capital that
this type of regime produces, with its emphasis on the family, is higher
than the level produced by the liberal regime.
However, there is another type of regime that may produce even more
dependence on family and friends. Some authors (e.g. Leibfriend 1992;
Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997) argued to consider the Mediterranean coun-
tries (ideal: Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) as a separate regime: the Latin
Rim. In this type of regime, instead of an ofcial level of social security,
an underdeveloped system of social security exists, accompanied by a high
degree of familialism. Recent evidence tells us that the percentage of old
people receiving home-help services is extremely low, whereas the per-
centage of old people living with their children is extremely high (Esping-
Andersen 1999: 61–3). Higher rates can be found only in Japan. Moreover,
Daly and Lewis (2000) state that care is actually privatised to the family
in these Latin Rim countries. From this characterization, we infer that
living in this type of regime actually forces people in most if not all
instances to rely on family and, possibly, friends. Hence this type of regime
produces the highest level of social capital, i.e. informal social contacts
with family and friends.
Consequently, we propose to test the hypotheses that the level of
particular dimensions of social capital, i.e. informal social contacts,
produced by welfare state regimes are rank ordered: the lowest level of
social capital is produced by the social-democratic regime, a higher level
by the liberal regime, an even higher level by the conservative-corporat-
ist regime, and the highest level by the Latin Rim regime.
Individual differences and dimensions of social capital
There are two reasons why we also incorporate individual characteristics
and political stances into our explanatory framework. First, apart from
differences between countries with regard to social capital, we like to explain
individual differences in particular dimensions of social capital. Second, we
like to consider the possibility of so-called compositional effects (Snijders
and Bosker 1999). If individual characteristics and/or political stances
explain, to some extent, an individual’s amount of social capital and if these
individual characteristics and political stances are unequally distributed
across countries, then they also explain, to some extent, the differences
in social capital across countries. These considerations permit a closer
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investigation of the impact of individual characteristics and political
stances on social capital. But then, what to expect?
Recent studies on social capital have provided detailed conceptualiza-
tions of social capital. However, amazingly few clues to derive hypotheses
on the relationship between individual characteristics and social capital are
available, urging (other) researchers to ll this lacuna (e.g. Sandefur and
Laumann 1998; Flap 1999), except for Putnam (2001). That is why we
have to take our refuge in related theoretical propositions. A rst line of
reasoning leads us to build on Coleman’s (1988) theoretical propositions
on the accumulation of different kinds of capital. At the individual level,
capital refers to skills and resources that facilitate production, but these
skills and resources are not consumed or otherwise used up in production.
Wilson and Musick (1997), elaborating upon this theoretical tradition,
explicitly state that social networks are a form of social capital, considered
to be a resource for collective action (e.g. to mobilize mutual help in times
of hardship). In addition, they imply that in order to produce social capital,
one may need other kinds of capital, i.e. human capital and cultural capital.
Human capital refers to individual resources such as educational attain-
ment, income and health status (Wilson and Musick 1997: 698). Cultural
capital refers to religiosity (ibid.: 699–700). Their general proposition is
that there is a positive relationship between the different kinds of capital,
implying that the more human and/or cultural capital the individual has
(accumulated), the more social capital one acquires. Although Portes
(1998) stresses the non-directional nature of this proposition, we may use
it to derive hypotheses pertaining to positive effects of educational attain-
ment, income level and health on particular dimensions of social capital:
the higher one’s educational attainment, or the higher one’s income, or
the better one’s health, the more informal social contacts. Moreover, since
religious institutions may provide their members with moral convictions
to support solidary relationships (cf. Durkheim 1897/1966; Wilson and
Musick 1997), religiosity may also produce social contacts.
A second line of reasoning, starting from a self-interest thesis (cf.
d’Anjou et al. 1995; Gelissen 2000), leads us, however, to quite contradic-
tory hypotheses. The core idea of homo economicus – i.e. man guided by
enlightened self-interest – leads us to propose that those who are actually
aware of the (practical) possibility that they run the risk of being depen-
dent on others to help them eventually, would anticipate such possibilities
by investments in social capital (Flap 1999). Therefore, we would argue
that those who are worse off, or those who fear to be worse off in the
future – in terms of their nancial situation or in terms of their health –
are more likely to be aware of such future dependencies and, consequently,
set out to acquire more social capital. This would lead us to test contra-
dictory hypotheses pertaining to negative effects of income level and
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health on particular dimensions of social capital: the lower one’s income,
or the worse one’s health, the more social contacts.
Yet a third line of reasoning suggests that social capital is not just a
matter of resources and is referred to as the ideology thesis (cf. d’Anjou et
al. 1995; Gelissen 2000). Building on propositions derived from Inglehart
(1977), this line of reasoning proposes that particular political stances (e.g.
a left-wing orientation or post-materialism) make people more keen on
social or immaterial rather than material issues, and therefore reinforce
solidarity and social integration. This line seems to imply that these
political stances induce social contacts.
Data and measurements
We will test our hypotheses with secondary data derived from the
Eurobarometer 37.2 survey (Reiff and Melich 1992), conducted in 1992
in thirteen European countries with different welfare states. This survey
includes valid and presumably reliable data on at least some dimensions
of social capital as well as on individual characteristics that we consider to
be relevant determinants of particular dimensions of social capital. An
important feature of these data is that they were collected among
Europeans over 60 years of age. Consequently, these people are well
comparable as regards their life course outcomes, since age effects may be
of minor importance in these samples: these people have come to an
age to count their blessings. The samples were drawn according to a
multi-stage random design. First, so-called administrative regional units
were drawn to represent metropolitan, urban and rural areas. Second,
within these units, a random starting address was drawn and further
addresses were selected by random route procedures. Third, at each
address, the actual respondent was selected randomly. For further details
of Eurobarometer sampling methodology and survey design, see
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo >.
The particular dimensions of social capital that we focus on were
measured at the individual level by two questions on the frequency of
contact with family and friends, with contact frequencies ranging from
every day to never. At rst glance these may be considered to be rather
meagre measurements, but they actually provide us with information on
the extent to which people have access to social networks of family and
friends, which is in line with previous studies on social capital (cf. Wilson
and Musick 1997; Paxton 1999).
At the contextual level we distinguished among welfare state regimes.
Since Esping-Andersen convincingly states that welfare states embody
more than simply the amount of social expenditure or the granting of
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social rights, we follow his view that we must also take into account how
state activities are interlocked with the market’s and family’s role in social
provisions. Since he has classied a number of countries in a typology of
welfare states, many authors have followed him. Arts and Gelissen (1999)
show a remarkable consistency in classifying countries. Reviewing the
state of the art, they ascertained that all authors agree that Great Britain
and Ireland belong to the liberal-leaning type of regime. Furthermore, all
authors agree that the Nordic countries belong to the social-democratic
regime category, including Denmark. There have been some disputes
whether the Netherlands should also be included in this category of the
typology. Wildeboer Schut et al. (2000) show, based on fty-eight charac-
teristics collected in eleven welfare state regimes, that there are ample
empirical reasons to do so, although the Netherlands also has some cor-
poratistic characteristics. There have also been some disputes over the
countries that belong to the conservative-corporatistic regimes. Again,
Wildeboer et al. (2000) show convincingly that Belgium, France and West
Germany belong to this category. We decided to add Luxembourg,
because it is in the geographical and economical proximity of these three
countries. Since Leibfriend’s (1992) study, most authors agree that Spain,
Italy, Portugal and Greece belong to the Latin Rim regimes. This leaves
us with East Germany as a special case, more than often ignored in
previous studies. We assume this country to be situated in the social-
democratic camp, since the people included in the samples have – at least
most of their lives up to the year of data collection – been exposed to the
socialist regime of the German Democratic Republic. To test this assump-
tion, we will treat this country as a separate (dummy) variable. Moreover,
we decided to test whether particular characteristics of these welfare states
may contribute to the amount of social capital present in these societies.
Thus we included measurements on the amount of GDP spent on social
security benets or on pension provisions in the year 1991/1992. These
data have been derived from the International Labour Ofce (ILO 2001).
At the level of individuals, educational attainment was measured as the
age at which one had nished one’s educational career. Income was
measured objectively by referring to the actual amount of money available
monthly and was standardised within each country.1 Health status was
measured by a question on long-term disability, indicating a rather poor
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1. About 20 per cent of our respondents refused to answer the question on income.
Therefore, we replaced their answer by the country-specic mean on income. Further-
more, a dummy variable was created for this category of respondents as a control
variable. Preliminary analyses were performed to check whether the effect of this
variable was signicant. Only where this was the case, this control variable was also
included into the nal analyses presented here.
health status. Religiosity was unfortunately not measured as in Euro-
barometers, including both denomination and church attendance, but
only referred to being religious or not and to being interested in religion
or not. We decided to include gender, marital status, household size and
age as controls because these variables may also be related to social capital:
women may be more ‘social’ and, consequently, acquire more social
capital, married people may have more opportunities to build and keep up
social networks as compared to single people, and one’s household size
may confound one’s social capital. Similarly, if there is any age effect, we
would argue that as one grows older, it becomes more likely that one’s
network of family and friends – caused by natural deaths – decreases.
Moreover, we included type of community to test whether small com-
munities produce more social capital and whether big cities ‘destroy’ social
capital. To test the ideological thesis, we used a standard measurement of
post-materialism included in the data as well as a standard measurement
of left-wing versus right-wing political stances.2
Analyses
Our hypotheses, as well as our data, are hierarchically structured, i.e. indi-
viduals – at level 1 – living in different countries – at level 2. Therefore,
we employed multi-level analysis (Bryk and Raudenbusch 1992; Kreft and
de Leeuw 1998; Snijders and Bosker 1999) using the ML-WIN package
(Goldstein 1995). In a rst step (model 1) we estimated a so-called baseline
model containing only an intercept (b0ij). This model was used to test
whether there is variance at the individual level (se0ij) but more import-
antly, to test whether there is any variance at the country level (su0j) This
turned out to be the case, as may be seen in Table 1. At the individual level
as well as at the country level there is signicant variance in social capital
(social contacts with family and social contacts with friends).
In a second step, we introduced our individual variables (model 2) to
explain social capital on the individual level. Furthermore, if these vari-
ables have an effect on social capital and if their distribution is unequal
across countries then they serve as a compositional explanation for the
variance found at the country level (Snijders and Bosker 1999). This
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2. As with income, those respondents who refused to answer the question whether they
considered themselves political left or right received the country-specic mean score
as a substitution. Also, a dummy variable was created as control variable. Preliminary
analyses were performed to check whether the effect of this variable was signicant.
Only where this was the case, this control variable was also included into the nal
analyses presented here.
compositional explanation is considerable for our rst dimension of social
capital – i.e. contacts with family – where we nd a considerable reduc-
tion in level 2 variance (from 0.176 to 0.093). For contacts with friends,
however, the reduction in level 2 variance is only minor (from 0.389 to
0.357).3 In both cases, the log-likelihood was reduced signicantly. This
indicates that the level 1 variables do have an effect on both aspects of an
individual’s amount of social capital.
Our third step is the inclusion of ideological factors which may also
indicate compositional explanations for the variance at the level of
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3. In subsequent analyses we found that education and household size in particular were
responsible for the compositional effect on social contact with one’s family. Both vari-
ables have a signicant effect on social contact with one’s family and their distributions
are far from being equal across countries.
TABLE 1. Level 1 variance and level 2 variance + –2*log-likelihood of multi-level models
Contact with family Contact with friends
estimate standard Dlog/df estimate standard Dlog/df
error error
Model 1: baseline
Level 1 variance (se0ij) 2.917 0.060 2.878 0.059
Level 2 variance (su0j) 0.176 0.072 0.389 0.156
–2*log-likelihood (IGLS) 18398.1 18344.9
Model 2: model 1
+ level 1 variables
Level 1 variance (se0ij) 2.728 0.056 2.802 0.058
Level 2 variance (su0j) 0.093 0.040 0.357 0.143
–2*log-likelihood (IGLS) 18077.4 –320.7/14 18218.0 –126.9/14
Model 3: model 2 +
Ideological variables
Level 1 variance (se0ij) 2.725 0.056 2.793 0.058
Level 2 variance (su0j) 0.091 0.039 0.367 0.147
–2*log-likelihood (IGLS) 18070.8 –6.6/3 18203.7 –14.3/4
Model 4: model 3 +
typology
Level 1 variance (se0ij) 2.725 0.056 2.793 0.058
Level 2 variance (su0j) 0.041 0.019 0.042 0.020
–2*log-likelihood (IGLS) 18061.5 –9.3/4 18177.6 –26.1/4
Model 5: model 3 +
social expenditure
Level 1 variance (e0ij) 2.725 0.056 2.793 0.058
Level 2 variance (u0j) 0.051 0.023 0.187 0.020
–2*log-likelihood (IGLS) 18064.0 +2.5/–3 18195.1 +17.5/–3
countries. This turned out not to be the case as the variances did not differ
greatly from the ones in model 2. The ideological factors do have an effect
on social capital though, indicated by the signicant decrease of the log-
likelihood ratios. However, these effects on the individual level will be
much lower compared to our other individual variables, because the log-
likelihood was lowered in a nearly non-signicant way.
In a fourth step, we included the types of regimes (four dummies) as a
possible explanation for the variance at the country level that still remains
after the inclusion of both individual and ideological factors (model 3). As
can been seen in Table 1, the log-likelihood ratio dropped from 18070.8
to 18061.5 in the model where social capital is indicated by social contacts
with one’s family. The difference of 9.3 was a result of using four degrees
of freedom, and therefore is signicant (a = .10); also, the remaining
variance at the level of countries was brought down from .091 to .041.
This reduction is even stronger for our second dimension of social capital,
i.e. contacts with friends: the inclusion of the types of regimes resulted in
a signicant drop of the log-likelihood (18203.7 2 18177.6 = 26.1) and
the variance at the country level was substantially lowered.
Our nal step is a model in which the four dummies, indicating type of
regime, were replaced by a metric variable, i.e. social expenditure.
Compared to model 4, model 5 uses three degrees of freedom less. In case
social contact with one’s family is the dependent variable, the log-likeli-
hood increases from 18061.5 (model 4) to 18064.0 (model 5), and is non-
signicant, even at rather high a’s. From the viewpoint of parsimony,
model 5 is therefore preferred over model 4. However, if we take a look
at model 4 and 5 to predict our second dimension of social capital, i.e.
social contact with friends, there is a signicant increase in the log-likeli-
hood. In this case, we cannot use the parsimony argument. We will look
more closely at the effects of each variable included in our models in the
following section.
Results
Let us rst consider the individual effects on the frequency of social
contact with members of the family. Table 2 shows both unstandardized
and standardized effects.4 Regarding individual-level effects, we nd that
the longer one has enjoyed an educational career, the less social contact
one has with the family. However, having accumulated money, and con-
sequently a high income contributes to more contact with family
Welfare states and social  capital SCHEEPERS et  al .
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members. According to Table 2, people who have a long-term disability
seem to have slightly more contact with their family compared to people
who are not, but this difference is non-signicant. However, it turns out
that people who consider themselves to be religious have signicantly
more social contact with their family members than do non-religious
people. Next, we nd that our control variables provide additional
insights. People who are married and/or who live together have signi-
cantly more contact with the family than do single people. The same holds
for widows and widowers and/or people who are divorced: they have more
frequent contact with the family than do single people. Household size
has a positive effect, meaning that the more people there are living in one’s
household, the more social contacts one has with one’s family. Living in
the city is not that benecial for social contact with one’s family, as may
be ascertained from the signicant differences with people living in
medium-sized and rural areas: the latter have signicantly more social
contact with their family than do city dwellers. We nd also that the
longer one lives, the less one has contact with members of one’s family,
probably because many of one’s family contemporaries have died. Finally,
we nd no signicant gender differences.
Next, we look at model 3 to address the issue whether social contact
with one’s family is affected by one’s political stances. In all cases, the
effects of political stances are quite low and only the mixed type of
(post)materialism reached signicance.5
In model 4, we introduced the types of regimes in the model to explain
the level 2 variance that still existed after we took into account both indi-
vidual and ideological variables. We nd, according to model 4, that
people living in liberal regimes have more (.321) contact with their family.
However, the difference with people living in social-democratic regimes
does not reach signicance. Next, we nd that people living in conserva-
tive-corporatist regimes actually have signicantly more (.385) social
contact with their family, which also holds for those living in the Latin
Rim regimes. The latter – compared to people living in the social-
democratic regimes – have the most frequent social contact (.696) with
their family. People living in former East Germany do not differ signi-
cantly from the social-democratic regimes.
In model 5, we test the idea that we can do without the typology
inspired by Esping-Andersen, because of all its disputes as to what
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5. We tested also whether effects of individual-level predictors of contact with family and
contact with friends are variable across countries. Only in one case did the test reach
signicant values (i.e. the effect of household size varied signicantly across countries
where contact with family is the dependent variable). Given these results, we can only
conclude that the effects presented are quite robust across countries.
countries should be of what type. Therefore, we substituted the typology
with the amount of social expenditure of the countries involved. Model 5
shows that the level of social security makes people less dependent on their
families, as the unstandardized effect of this contextual level predictor is
2 .039: the more that is spent on social security in the country, the less
social contact people have with their family. Apart from that, nothing
much changes: the majority of the other predictors have similar, if not the
same, effects they had when we included the type of welfare state regimes
in the models. This implies that, in terms of the direct effects related to
social capital, there is not much to gain in using the typology. Also in terms
of a reduction of variance shown in Table 1, there are only minor differ-
ences. Including the dummies for welfare regimes reduces the variance at
level 2 from .091 to .041 which is a reduction of 55 per cent (using four
degrees of freedom), whereas including merely the expenditure on social
security reduces the variance from .091 to .051, i.e. a reduction of 44 per
cent (using one degree of freedom). Also in terms of log-likelihood ratios,
there is no difference between model 4 and model 5.
If we compare the standardised coefcients or beta-weights, which are
comparable across the two levels, then we rst have to conclude that the
effects of our level 1 and level 2 variables are quite low (0 is no effect, 1 is
maximum effect). Note that the effects of types of regimes (0.136) and
social security expenditure ( 2 0.122) are almost equal to the strongest
individual predictors: marital status (0.143) and household size (0.142).
Now let us turn to a comparison of social contact with friends across
different welfare state regimes (Table 3). As to individual effects, we nd
that educational attainment does not have an effect on social contact with
friends, whereas the level of income, i.e. a resource for maintaining family
contact, now seems to have a deteriorating effect on social contact with
friends, as this parameter estimate is negative ( 2 .050). Maintaining one’s
health – which turned out to have no effect on contact with the family –
is of importance in keeping contact with friends. It turns out that the
difference between people who live with a long-term disability and those
who do not is signicant (.243). Again, we nd that people who consider
themselves to be religious are in the presumably happy surroundings of
friends: they have signicantly more social contact with friends than do
non-religious people. Once again, we can derive additional insights from
our control variables. Being married reduces (2 .264) contact with friends
as compared to being single. People who live in medium-sized or rural
towns again turn out to have signicantly more social contact with their
friends as compared to people living in the city. Furthermore, we nd that
as one grows older, one has fewer friends, presumably because they have
passed away. Finally, men turn out to have more social contact with friends
than do women.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Let us look at the effects of ideological stances (model 3). They turn
out to have no effects whatsoever, with one rather odd exception: those
who do not know what left- or right-wing position they have turn out to
have fewer friends ( 2 .218). This may imply that if one wants to keep one’s
friends it is better to argue with them over political stances than to refrain
from political discussion.
Next, we included the welfare state regimes (plus former East Germany)
as determinants of these social contacts. Again, we nd signicant differ-
ences between regimes. However, they are different from the pattern we
ascertained regarding contacts with family members. We nd that people
living in conservative-corporatist regimes do not differ signicantly from
people living in social-democratic regimes to the extent to which they have
contacts with friends. This also holds for people living in former East
Germany. People living in the liberal regime, however, now turn out to
have signicantly more contact (0.968) with friends, and people living in
the Latin Rim regime have, as expected, more social contact (1.339) with
friends than people living in the social-democratic regime.
Let us turn to the comparison of model 4 and model 5, in which we
have substituted the welfare regimes with the amount of social security
expenditure per country. We nd that the more a government spends on
social security, the fewer friends its citizens have ( 2 .080). Again, we nd
that this substitution does not alter many of the other individual level
effects. In fact, this substitution does not lead to substantially different
conclusions. However, when we compare the amount of reduction of
variance, we nd large differences between the models. Including the
dummies for the welfare regimes reduces the variance at level 2 from an
initial .367 to .042 which implies a reduction of 89 per cent, whereas
including merely the amount of social expenditure reduces the variance
from .367 to .187 which implies a reduction of 49 per cent. This differ-
ence in reduction, even if we take into account the different number of
degrees of freedom, is substantial. Also in terms of log-likelihood ratios,
model 4 ts the data far better than model 5. We will return to this issue
of comparing both models in the following section.
The standardized coefcients in Table 3 are rather small, save for the
effect of types of regimes (.330) and the effect of social security expendi-
ture ( 2 0.245). Direct effects at the individual level are therefore quite
minor as compared to the country-level effects.
Conclusions and discussion
In this contribution, we set out to answer questions on the relationship
between individual characteristics, political stances and living in a
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particular welfare state regime, on the one hand, and a specic set of life
course outcomes, on the other, particular dimensions of social capital:
social contacts with family and friends. This refers to the access to or avail-
ability of social networks of family and friends that may provide people
with a number of resources. We consider this relationship to be rather
crucial in the dispute over the effects of welfare states. These dimensions
of social capital refer to actual daily routines – such as having social
contacts with family and friends – that are generally considered to be
helpful for many purposes, but particularly with regard to social solidarity:
caring for one another in good times and bad times. According to func-
tionalist modernization theory, processes of individualization have gener-
ally eroded social networks. However, we took the perspective of testing
a more differential view related to individualization, initially brought to
the fore by Esping-Andersen. Esping-Andersen claims that there will be
large differences between welfare state regimes to the extent to which
people are forced to rely on their family and friends or to rely on collec-
tive arrangements, institutionalized over the decades since the Second
World War. Actually, we found signicant variations among welfare state
regimes in the amount of social capital of their populations. This refutes
the non-differential view postulated by functionalist modernization
theory.
To explain individual differences in the amount of social contact with
family and friends, we included several individual characteristics and
political stances in our multi-level models. We found signicant differ-
ences between (social categories of) people harbouring different amounts
of ‘capital’. Religious people – considered to have considerable cultural
capital – indeed have more social contact with family as well as with
friends. We found similar patterns for people living in medium-sized and
rural towns: these people enjoy more social contact than those living in
big cities. This implies that living in big cities seems to ‘destroy’ social
contact. Furthermore, we found quite differential effects for different
indicators of human capital. The effect of educational attainment varies:
it seems to mar social contact with family members yet it has no effect
whatsoever on contact with friends. These effects may be due to the fact
that pursuing an educational career often involves geographical mobility
which in turn makes it difcult, during adolescent years, to maintain
contact with one’s family. Later, another type of geographical mobility, i.e.
moving from one job to another – often considered to be one of the bless-
ings of individualized societies – may be detrimental to frequent contacts
with friends. The opposite holds for the level of income: it fosters social
contact with one’s family but is detrimental to contact with friends. This
also applies to being married, i.e. one of our additional predictors of social
capital: being married is good for contact with the family; however, it
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reduces social contact with friends. In terms of the theory on different
kinds of capital as being related to social capital, the latter ndings imply
that the outcomes of these so-called human resources (such as educational
attainment and income) are quite different for different aspects of social
capital. Overall, this implies that this theory on different kinds of capital
probably needs to be rened. Contrary to the individual characteristics
included, the two political stances (i.e. (post)materialism and political
orientation) had no explanatory power.
Given the fact that the aforementioned variables have an effect on social
capital and that their distributions are not necessarily equal across coun-
tries, we could also partly explain the variance found in social capital on
the level of countries. The compositional effects were considerable when
social capital was indicated by social contacts with one’s family and much
less when social contact with friends indicated the amount of social capital.
Besides individual characteristics and political stances, we included the
four types of regimes, led by theoretical propositions suggested by
Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) to explain the variance not accounted for
by individual-level effects. Because we had data from ‘merely’ thirteen
European countries, we feel that we have to be somewhat cautious in this
regard: obviously, our conclusions would be rmer if we had data from
more countries. However, we tried to carry out the analyses as rigorously
as possible to reach our conclusions. We found that people living in social-
democratic welfare state regimes, with their tendency to collectivize care,
have the lowest level of social capital as compared to other regimes: people
living in these regimes have the least social contact with family as well as
with friends. An interesting nding, in this respect, is that the amount of
social capital of citizens of the former German Democratic Republic did
not signicantly differ from the social capital of citizens of social-
democratic welfare states. Vice versa, people living in the Latin Rim
regimes – with their underdeveloped systems of social security and, con-
sequently, their reliance on family arrangements – have the highest level
of social capital, i.e. the most social contact with family and friends. The
other type of regimes were in between as regards social capital. The popu-
lations living in the liberal regime do not differ from the social-democratic
countries with respect to family contacts. However, the former have far
more social contact with friends than do the latter. People living in the
conservative-corporatist regime – with its strong emphasis on familialism
– actually turn out to have more social contact with their family than do
people in the social-democratic regime. However, there are no differences
between these two types of regime regarding social contact with friends.
A comparison of the effects of living in a certain type of welfare state
regime with the effects of living in countries that differ by the amount of
social expenditure reveals that they are almost equal when social contact
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with one’s family is the dependent variable. If we try to explain contact
with friends, then types of regime have a stronger effect than social expen-
diture. One has to keep in mind, though, that in the latter case the con-
servative-corporatist countries do not match the theoretical propositions.
Thus our conclusion is that there is no decisive empirical argument to
choose the typology (which country belongs to what type on what
grounds?) as proposed by Esping-Andersen instead of social expenditure
to explain these dimensions of social capital. A typology of welfare states
has the theoretical advantage of providing a qualitative account of the
extent to which social contacts are realized in different societies. But
whether one is inclined to use the typology or its metric counterpart, it is
important to note that both determinants were translated into testable
hypotheses on social capital based on the insightful characterization of
welfare states, and both by and large have stood the test.
This conclusion is quite the opposite of previous conclusions on the
effects of living in welfare state regimes on attitudes towards government
intervention in social policy, where signicant but sometimes unexpected
effects of the typology were found (c.f. Gundelach 1994; Svallfors 1997;
Gelissen 2000). From these composite ndings, we infer a more general
hypothesis: the impact of living in welfare state regimes will be stronger
for actual daily routines than it is for more general socio-political atti-
tudes. The rationale for this hypothesis may be that, individually, quite
different ideological stances will be of more importance for these atti-
tudes, whereas for daily behaviour these ideological stances may be of less
importance than the constitution of the welfare state regime in which one
lives. In sum, to answer our initial questions, we found that the cross-
national differences in the amount of social capital are partly explained by
compositional differences on the individual level (save for the ideological
variables) and partly explained by the national characteristics of the
welfare state regime, be it their level of decommodication or of social
expenditure. In order to explain individual differences in particular
dimensions of social capital, the inclusion of national characteristics – in
addition to individual-level characteristics – may thus be a fruitful endeav-
our for future research.
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